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Abstract
The advancement of technology and reliance on information systems have fos-
tered an environment of sharing and trust. The rapid growth and dependence on these
systems, however, creates an increased risk associated with the insider threat. The
insider threat is one of the most challenging problems facing the security of informa-
tion systems because the insider already has capabilities within the system. Despite
research efforts to prevent and detect insiders, organizations remain susceptible to this
threat because of inadequate security policies and a willingness of some individuals
to betray their organization. To investigate these issues, a formal security model and
risk analysis framework are used to systematically analyze this threat and develop
effective mitigation strategies.
This research extends the Schematic Protection Model to produce the first com-
prehensive security model capable of analyzing the safety of a system against the
insider threat. The model is used to determine vulnerabilities in security policies and
system implementation. Through analysis, mitigation strategies that effectively re-
duce the threat are identified. Furthermore, an action-based taxonomy that expresses
the insider threat through measurable and definable actions is presented.
A risk analysis framework is also developed that identifies individuals within an
organization that display characteristics indicative of a malicious insider. The frame-
work uses a multidisciplinary process by combining behavior and technical attributes
to produce a single threat level for each individual within the organization. Statisti-
cal analysis using the t-distribution and prediction interval on the threat levels reveal
those individuals that are a potential threat to the organization. The effectiveness of
the framework is illustrated using the case study of Robert Hanssen, demonstrating
the process would likely have identified him as an insider threat.
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Formal Mitigation Strategies for the Insider Threat:
A Security Model and Risk Analysis Framework
I. Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Air Force rely heavily on information
systems to accomplish their missions. The rapid growth in technology continues to
bolster communication, information sharing, and asset management–to name just a
few benefits. It is impossible to imagine any scenario where the DoD or Air Force
would wage a war or defend the nation’s interest without leveraging technology and
information systems.
Unfortunately, with these benefits also comes an increased risk for attack. The
reliance on and use of information systems have made information progressively easier
to obtain and exploit. For the DoD and Air Force, this makes the insider threat one
of the greatest risks to information systems and the resources they store.
The insider threat is characterized as authorized users performing unauthorized
activities. The difficulty associated with the malicious insider is they are the very
same person you trust, making them one of the hardest threats to detect. An insider
is in position to cause significant damage because the individual already has access to
the system and can usually ignore mechanisms designed to prevent an attack. Addi-
tionally, the insider typically knows where the target is and can exploit information
without drawing attention to himself. This makes the insider threat one of the most
challenging problems facing the security to information systems.
1.2 Background
The security of a system is defined by its confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity requirements. These aspects are protected by an organization’s security policy. A
1
security policy is a statement that dictates what is allowed and what is not allowed
on the system. Once the policy is defined, strategies and techniques are devised to
enforce the policy. The benefits of an effective security policy alone, however, are not
enough to prevent attacks. Ultimately, security is a people problem and the behav-
ioral characteristics of individuals can thwart even the strictest security policy. To
implement a secure system, it is therefore necessary to identify the risks inherent with
individuals as well as enforce a sound security policy.
Two important tools in computer and information security are security models
and risk analysis. Security models can be used to determine the effectiveness of a
policy and determine how to enforce security for a system. Risk analysis is a formal
process that evaluates the likelihood of a compromise occurring.
The insider threat continues to be an elusive problem. There is currently no
formal security model to analyze the safety of a policy against the insider threat and
risk analysis methodologies are not sufficient. If a security model can determine the
effectiveness of a security policy and risk analysis can identify potential malicious
insiders, then the insider threat to an organization can be reduced. Thus, the need
for a formal security model and risk analysis for the insider threat is clear.
1.3 Research Focus
The primary focus of this research is to develop methods to formally analyze
the safety and security of a system for the insider threat. The problems are addressed
through a formal security model that analyzes security policies and a formal method
for identifying individuals that pose a risk. By addressing the insider threat using
systematic and formal processes, this study encourages sound policy implementation
and risk analysis that can reduce the insider threat to information systems.
1.3.1 Objectives. This research has two objectives. The first is to develop
a security model for the insider threat. Security models represent an abstract policy
in a systematic manner so analysis can be performed. The security model provides
2
appropriate assumptions about the system and generalizes what is possible or im-
possible, given the assumptions. Through logical analysis or mathematical proof the
model determines if violations to the policy occur and where mitigation techniques
can be applied. A security model provides a process to determine if a given protection
schema can formally be proven safe.
The second objective is to develop a formal risk analysis process for the insider
threat. When an individual betrays his organization, he produces characteristics
that are capable of being observed. These characteristics take the form of behavior
attributes or technical activities that can identify a potential insider threat. These
indicators identify suspicious individuals that display a credible amount of threat so
follow-up action can be taken.
These two objectives identify the scope of this research. Developing a security
model and risk analysis technique provides a systematic and formal methodology for
addressing the insider threat. The attributes of formal analysis leads to effective
prevention and detection techniques.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remaining document is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the insider
threat by examining trends, case studies, and related work on security models and risk
analysis. Chapter III presents the methodology for accomplishing the goals of this
research. Chapter IV introduces a security model for the insider threat and demon-
strates its effectiveness. Chapter V discusses a risk analysis process for identifying
potential malicious insiders. Chapter VI presents conclusions, significance, and areas
for future research.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter is an overview of the principles associated with the insider threat. Ini-
tially, the characteristics and attributes of the malicious insider are examined. Se-
curity models are reviewed to determine methodologies for representing the insider
threat. A formalization for analyzing the safety of an information system is discussed
using the Schematic Protection Model. Finally, risk analysis frameworks for the in-
sider threat are presented.
2.1 Malicious Insider Profile
Examining trends in attacks and attributes of prior attackers provide a better
understanding of threats and lead to more effective countermeasures. For this reason,
analysis of the problem begins by examining the profile and characteristics of the
malicious insider.
2.1.1 Insider Threat Studies. In August, 2004 the Secret Service National
Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) and the CERT Coordination Center of Carnegie
Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute (CERT/CC) published a study of
insider incidents involving real-life case studies [29]. The study reviewed 23 incidents
involving malicious insiders in the banking and finance sector. One major finding of
the research was that most incidents required little technical sophistication. Accord-
ing to their analysis 87% of the malicious insiders performed simple, legitimate user
commands to carry out their actions and only a small number of cases required more
technical knowledge. This finding indicates it is important for organizations to real-
ize the risks associated with conventional users and not focus solely on the privileged
administrators or technically savvy.
Furthermore, malicious insiders typically planned their actions. In fact, 81% of
the activities were planned in advanced. This suggests a possibility for prevention
or detection of the attackers prior to the incident. Additionally, no common profile
for the attackers could be established. The attributes of the individuals ranged from
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18 to 59 years of age with 42% being females. Insiders were from a variety of ethnic
and racial backgrounds with 31% married. Because of the diversity of the malicious
insiders, profiling individuals based solely on personal attributes does not provide
significant indicators about a person’s threat potential.
In an additional study in May, 2005 the NTAC and CERT/CC viewed cases
specifically dealing with computer system sabotage [21]. This study examined in-
sider incidents across critical infrastructure sectors (banking and finance, information
and telecommunications, transportation, postal and shipping, emergency services,
continuity of government, public health, food, energy, water, chemical industry and
hazardous materials, agriculture, and defense industrial base) in which the insider’s
primary goal was to sabotage some aspect of the organization. This research also
found the majority of activities were planned in advance and 61% of the attacks in-
volved simple attack methods using legitimate user commands, information exchange,
or physical attack. In the 39% of cases involving one or more relatively sophisticated
methods, a script program, autonomous agent, toolkit, or flooding was involved in
the attack.
2.1.2 Trends. The annual FBI/CSI survey is currently in its tenth year
and has provided valuable insight into threats associated with computer systems.
The survey tracks computer security trends through responses from professionals in
U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial institutions, medical institutions,
and universities [16]. The 2005 report included 700 respondents that had a fairly
equal split between the number of successful attacks originating from the inside and
successful attacks from the outside as shown in Table 2.1.
The FBI/CSI survey also reports the number of detected insider attacks is on
the decline. Figure 2.1 displays the percent of respondents that detected various types
of attacks. This finding is in sharp contrast to what is commonly being reported in
other literature [6]. According to Bingham, their database indicates incidents are on
the rise [2]. The database maintained by Intrusic, called Insider Threat Watch, tracks
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Table 2.1: Number of Successful Attacks Experienced
by Organizations [16].
How Many incidents,
by % of respondents
1-5 6-10 >10 Don’t know
2005 43 19 9 28
2004 47 20 12 22
2003 38 20 16 26
2002 42 20 15 23
2001 33 24 11 31
2000 33 23 13 31
1999 34 22 14 29
How Many incidents from
the outside by % of respondents
1-5 6-10 >10 Don’t know
2005 47 10 8 35
2004 52 9 9 30
2003 46 10 13 31
2002 49 14 9 27
2001 41 14 7 39
2000 39 11 8 42
1999 43 8 9 39
How Many incidents from
the inside by % of respondents
1-5 6-10 >10 Don’t know
2005 46 7 3 44
2004 52 6 8 34
2003 45 11 12 33
2002 42 13 9 35
2001 40 12 7 41
2000 38 16 9 37
1999 37 16 12 35
malicious insider attacks and third party reports on each compromise. The disparity
in views can perhaps be explained by insider incidents not accurately being reported.
Reasons for this may include: insufficient evidence or damage to warrant prosecution;
negative publicity; or more insiders are remaining undetected [21, 36]. Only 20% of
the respondents for the FBI/CSI survey reported a compromise to law enforcement
citing fear of negative publicity as the key reason for not reporting. Some researchers
warn that survey data on computer crimes can be inaccurate due to the unreported
or undetected acts, however, it can still be useful in characterizing a minimal level of
threat and in drawing attention to security problems as a whole [36].
6
020
40
60
80
100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
P e
r c
e n
t  o
f  R
e s
p o
n d
e n
t s
Insider abuse of net access
Virus
Laptop/Mobile theft
Unauthorized access to information
Denial of Service
System penetration
Theft of proprietary info
Telecom fraud
Financial fraud
Sabotage
Abuse of Wireless Network
Misuse of public Web application
Web site Defacement
Figure 2.1: Trends in Detected Types of Attacks or Misuse
[16].
Even with conflicting reports about some aspects of the insider threat, experts
agree malicious insider attacks are not only more successful but also more costly than
external attacks [28]. According to the SANS Institute, the most serious security
breaches resulting in financial losses occur through unauthorized access by insiders
[22]. Their research showed an average cost of $57,000 for an attack originating from
outside an organization and an average of $2.7 million dollars for damages from an
insider attack. Additionally, the aforementioned study by NTAC and CERT/CC
demonstrated the cost to the critical infrastructure in Table 2.2.
There is no doubt the insider threat is a serious concern and can cause significant
damage since the individual already has access to the system he wants to compromise
and can usually bypass the mechanisms in place that are designed to prevent an
attack [33]. Additionally, the insider typically knows where the target is and can
complete the objective without drawing attention to themselves. The fundamental
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Table 2.2: Percentages of Organizations in the Critical
Infrastructure Experiencing Financial Losses [21].
Percentage of Organizations Financial Loss
42 $1− $20, 000
9 $20, 001− $50, 000
11 $50, 001− $100, 000
2 $100, 001− $200, 000
7 $200, 001− $300, 000
9 $1, 000, 001− $5, 000, 000
2 Greater than $10,000,000
problem in dealing with the insider threat is the malicious individual you are trying
to prevent, is the same person you trust.
The different studies and trend analysis provide some important characteristics
about the insider threat problem. The main characteristics are identified by the
following list:
• A malicious insider may have little technical ability
• The malicious insider’s action are typically planned in advance
• Malicious insiders do not share a common profile
• Gathering complete, dependable statistics about types/numbers of insider at-
tacks is inherently difficult
• The malicious insider can cause significant damage
• The malicious insider is a trusted individual
2.2 Case Studies
The previous section demonstrates malicious insiders cause significant damage.
This section expands on that by examining some historical malicious insider case
studies. The nine specific cases that are summarized had many similarities with
dozens of other insider cases that were reviewed from [12,21,29].
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Aldrich Ames is perhaps one of the most widely known espionage cases. In 1985
Ames was assigned to a counterintelligence unit and had access to highly classified
information [12]. He began selling secrets to the Russians around 1987, but wasn’t
actually arrested until 1994. During his time as a spy for the Soviets, he routinely
removed bags of documents from CIA headquarters and deposited them at dead drops
for his contacts. A search of his office after he was arrested revealed 144 classified
intelligence reports not related to his current assignment.
Robert Hanssen was arrested in 2001 and charged with spying for Russia for
more than 15 years [12, 41]. The case is different from Ames because Hanssen had
a high degree of technical expertise. Hanssen gathered classified information to sell
by exploiting the FBI’s computer system. He also used his access to a file system
containing classified information about ongoing cases to see if he was being inves-
tigated. To exchange information Hanssen made extensive use of encrypted floppy
disks, removable storage devices, and a handheld computer. Hanssen was responsi-
ble for providing over 6,000 pages of classified documents and the identities of three
Russian agents working for the United States.
Anna Montes was a senior intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency
[12]. In 2001 she was arrested for transmitting sensitive and classified intelligence in-
formation to Cuba for over 16 years. Montes communicated with the Cubans through
encrypted radio bursts and would meet with her contacts every three or four months
to exchange encrypted disks of information. Montes left evidence behind by not re-
moving all traces of the messages from her computer hard disk.
In 2000, Timothy Smith was a 37 year old civilian serving as an ordinary crew-
man on a US Navy ammunition and supply vessel [12]. He became upset by some
mistreatment from his crewmates and decided to get revenge by stealing and selling
classified materials to terrorist groups. When Smith was arrested 17 disks and five
confidential documents were discovered in his possession, including one describing the
transfer of ammunition and handling of torpedoes on US Navy vessels.
9
In 1978 Stanley Mark Rifkin, a 32 year old computer expert working as a con-
sultant for the Security Pacific National Bank in Los Angeles, discovered the secret
computer code the bank used to transfer funds to other banks telegraphically [13,33].
He used this information and the knowledge of the bank’s computer system to trans-
fer over ten million dollars to an alias account in New York. Using a phony passport
and documentation, he then had the money transferred to an account in Zurich. Al-
though Rifkin used no guns, bombs, or physical threats, his trusted position and
understanding of the system led to one of the largest bank robberies in history.
The remaining case studies are taken from the Insider Threat Studies [21,29] in
which the identities are not included in the literature. A city government employee
became disgruntled when passed over for a promotion. Out of vengeance she deleted
important files the day before the new person took office. It was never determined if
all of the deleted files were recovered.
A system administrator who developed and managed the computer network
for a manufacturing firm was angered by his diminishing role. In retaliation, he
centralized the companies manufacturing processes software to a single server and
planted a logic bomb. He then intimidated a coworker into giving him the backup
tapes for the software and detonated the logic bomb, deleting the only remaining copy
of the critical software causing an estimated $10 million in damage and leading to the
layoff of 80 employees.
An application developer who was laid off just prior to the Christmas holidays
launched a systematic attack on his former employer’s computer network using the
username and password of one of his former coworkers to gain remote access. He mod-
ified several of the company’s web pages by changing text and inserting pornographic
images and sent the company’s customers an email publicizing that the website had
been hacked. A month and a half after the initial incident, he again remotely ac-
cessed the network and executed a script to change 4,000 pricing records and reset all
network passwords.
10
In March 2002, ten billion files in the computer systems of an international
financial services company were deleted by a logic bomb. The logic bomb had been
planted by an employee that recently quit because of a dispute over the amount of
his annual bonus. The incident affected over 1,300 of the company’s servers and cost
an estimated $3 million to repair and reconstruct damaged files.
A common theme in the malicious insider cases is the attacker had both an
opportunity and motive. The opportunity was provided by rights obtained through
knowledge about the organization or granted permissions. The insider’s motives var-
ied from financial gain, ideology, ego gratification, under appreciation, disgruntleness,
and/or revenge. The technical ability of the perpetrators also ranged greatly from
highly advanced to simple user. Although their computer skills differed significantly,
all of them left behind trails of suspicious activity when performing access, commu-
nication, or modification to the system.
2.3 Security Models
The case studies demonstrate the ability of users to leverage their rights in the
system to cause damage. This problem can be mitigated by determining what rights
a user can obtain and if the rights violate an organization’s security policy. A method
for examining this is a security model.
Security models provide a formal way to analyze the safety of a system. A
system is considered safe if rights to system resources cannot be obtained by an
unauthorized subject. Representing a security policy through the formal rules of a
security model allow logical analysis to determine how violations occur and what
mitigation techniques are required to maintain the policy. If the model shows a
system is safe, then a system implementation using the model can result in a secure
system [23].
2.3.1 Security Models for the Insider Threat. There has been relatively
little work in developing a security model that includes the insider threat. Chinchani
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et al. provide the only research found to date that formally attempts to model the
insider threat [7]. Their methodologies propose a model that can be constructed by
a security analyst and tailored to a specific organization’s policy and structure. A
physical entity is represented as a vertex in the graph, with each piece of information
or capability that can be acquired by the vertex represented as a key. A directed
edge between vertices represents a communication channel or access. A key challenge
graph, similar to an access control list, defines actions that can take place in the
system. Using the key challenge graph and procedures for traversing an edge, activity
not allowed through the model can be detected.
Although this model addresses some concerns, it does not specifically define
the safety of a system or provide a comprehensive representation of the threat. The
scheme does not take into account some insiders use authorized rights to perform their
attacks which would not be identified as malicious activity in this model. Additionally,
this model does not address the safety question in a decidable manner. There is no
process for tractable analysis and no maximal state exists to examine the transfer of
rights.
2.3.2 Schematic Protection Model. There have been numerous formal secu-
rity models developed to analyze the safety of a system. None of these, however, were
designed with the insider threat in mind. One such model, the Schematic Protection
Model (SPM), was developed in 1988 to answer the safety question for a generic but
useful system [3]. The safety question determines whether or not a system can be
formally proven secure. SPM is discussed in detail in subsequent sections because it
is used as the basis for an insider threat security model.
2.3.3 Model Specifics. SPM defines the privileges possessed by subjects,
called tickets, and determines how the tickets can flow amongst entities in the system
[32]. If a system is in a safe initial state, then SPM can determine for a large class of
systems whether derivable states are safe.
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Each entity in the model has a protection type and a ticket flow based on this
type. Entities are assigned a protection type upon creation that does not change. An
entity is either a subject or object, where subjects are active entities and objects are
passive with regard to ticket transfer. Entity types are partitioned into a subject set
(TS) and an object set (TO), with the union of the two sets representing all types
(T ). The type of an entity X, is identified using the function τ(X).
The privileges that can be granted to a subject are identified as the rights in
the system. The rights are specified as either an inert right (RI) or a control right
(RC), and the set of all rights formed by their union (R). Inert rights cannot be used
to change the protection state of the system. For example, read, write, and execute
do not change the protection state of a system. Control rights, however, are rights
that affect the protection state of the system and the distribution of privileges.
Tickets represent capabilities associated with a system and grant privileges to a
subject. A ticket names a specific entity and a right associated with that entity. For
example, the ticket Y/x authorizes the possessor to perform the operation associated
with the right x on the entity Y. Multiple tickets for the same entity, like Y/u, Y/v,
Y/w can be abbreviated to Y/uvw. The domain of a subject (Dom) specifies the set
of tickets possessed by the subject.
The transfer of rights can occur if three conditions are met:
1. a copyable version of the ticket is in the domain of the subject transferring the
right,
2. a link exists between subjects involved in the transfer, and
3. the filter associated with the link allows the tickets to pass over the link.
A copyable version of a ticket is specified by the copy flag (c). For instance, the
ticket Y/x :c is a copyable version of Y/x. Absence of the copy flag means the right
cannot be copied to another entity.
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A link predicate determines if there is a connection between two subjects. If the
predicate evaluates to true, then a connection exists and can be used to copy tickets
from one domain to the other. A connection exists between X and Y for any right z
∈ RC for the conjunction or disjunction of the following:
1. X/z ∈ Dom(X),
2. X/z ∈ Dom(Y),
3. Y/z ∈ Dom(X),
4. Y/z ∈ Dom(Y),
5. true.
For example, the predicate:
link(X,Y)=Y/u ∈ Dom(X) ∨ X/v ∈ Dom(Y)
evaluates to true if X has u rights over Y or Y has v rights over X. If the predicate
is true, X and Y are connected. Rule 5 represents the universal link that does not
depend on the entities rights. That is, a connection between X and Y exists regardless
if the entities have tickets that refer to each other.
For a copy to occur, the ticket must also be specified in the appropriate filter
function. Each link predicate (denoted by subscript i) has a corresponding filter:
fi : TS × TS → 2T×R (2.1)
The function fi maps TS × TS to the power set of T × R and simply specifies the
range of copyable tickets that can be transferred between two subjects. This function
is the final condition required for the transfer of rights to occur.
Thus, a right can be transferred from one entity to another provided three
specific requirements are met: the right has a copy flag, a link exists between the
two entities and the filter allows the transfer of rights. Formally, Y/x :c can be copied
from Dom(A) to Dom(B), if and only if all of the following are true for some i :
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1. Y/x :c ∈ Dom(A),
2. linki(A,B),
3. τ(Y)/x :c ∈ fi(τ(A),τ(B)).
The create operation introduces new subjects and objects into the system and
is specified by can-create (cc). For a subject of type a to create entities of type b, then
cc(a, b) must hold. If can-create holds, the create-rule cr(a, b) specifies the tickets that
are created. The two different types of creates are: a subject creates an object or a
subject creates a subject.
When a subject creates an object, the tickets for the object are placed in the do-
main of the subject. For example, let RI={r :c,w :c,x :c} and cr(a, b)={b/r :c, b/w :c}.
If subject A creates an object B, it adds tickets B/r :c and B/w :c to its domain under
the rule specified by cr(a, b).
When a subject creates another subject, the creator can be granted tickets over
the new subject and the new subject can be granted creator tickets. The create-rule
is specified as: cr(a, b) = LEFT |RIGHT . If subject A of type a creates Subject B of
type b, the tickets specified by the left part of cr(a, b) = LEFT |RIGHT are placed in
the domain of A and the tickets specified by the right part are placed in the domain
of B. For example, let R={r :c,w :c,x :c}, cr(a, b)={b/r :c,b/w :c | a/r :c}. If subject A
creates subject B, A will add the tickets B/r :c and B/w :c to its domain and B will be
created with A/r :c in its domain. To avoid confusion, if two subjects of the same type
are specified, such as cr(a, a), the special symbol self is introduced to identify tickets
associated with the creator. For example, the ticket self /w refers to the creator and
a/w refers to the created subject.
The final two issues when creating an entity deals with attenuation of privileges
and the rule of acyclic creates. The principle attenuation of privileges states no entity
may have more rights than the entity that created it. This policy is enforced through
the create-rules. The rule of acyclic creates limits the creation of subject types such
that it is not possible for a subject to directly or indirectly create a new subject of
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the same type as it’s creator. For the creation cc(a, b), subject A can create a subject
B, however subject B and none of it’s subsequent children can create a subject type
a. This eliminates cycles that could otherwise be associated with cc.
2.3.4 Example. The following example from Bishop demonstrates an owner-
based policy in which the owner of an object can authorized another subject access to
the object [3]. Consider user Peter wants to give another user Paul execute permissions
to a file he owns called doom. The SPM specification is: τ(Peter)= τ(Paul)=user,
τ(doom)=file, and doom/x :c ∈ Dom(Peter). All users are considered connected
and any user can give rights away to any other user, so link(Peter,Paul)=true and
τ(doom)/x ∈ f (τ(Peter),τ(Paul)). Because the ticket has the copy flag, a link exists,
and the filter includes the ticket, Peter can copy the ticket doom/x to Paul.
2.3.5 Extensions and Implementation. There have been several extensions
to SPM since its initial development. One created a process for conditional tickets
and a means to provide authentication [40]. Another extended SPM by incorporating
the revocation of privileges [39]. These extensions demonstrate the ability to adapt
the model to address different situations.
SPM provides a formal means to measure and analyze the safety of a system.
It demonstrates the safety question is decidable if the schema is acyclic and attenu-
ating. This attribute allows SPM to incorporate security policies into a model and
demonstrate the effectiveness of the policies if implemented into a system. However,
even with the expressiveness of the model and ability to characterize the security of
a system, no publications were found that use SPM to model the insider threat.
2.4 Risk Analysis
The security of a system is different than the safety of a system. Security
refers to the implementation of a protection system. It is possible for a system to be
safe with respect to all rights but the implementation is not secure [3]. A security
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model is used to perform a theoretical analysis of a system. Although this provides
a fundamental baseline, the intricacies and complicated nature of systems make im-
plementing a completely secure system unfeasible. Mechanisms designed to prevent
or detect attacks are often full of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a mali-
cious individual [42]. The insider threat magnifies this problem because individuals
are granted access rights to the system. For this reason, risk analysis is critical in
maintaining the security of a system.
Risk analysis provides a means to formally identify individuals that pose a
risk to the security of a system. There are many factors that may contribute to
an individual’s risk, ranging from behavioral characteristics to access on the system.
These factors in the form of behavioral attributes or technical activities are indicators
that can identify a potential insider threat.
2.4.1 Workshops. In August, 2000 an insider threat workshop sponsored by
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communi-
cations and Intelligence (C3I) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) met to discuss the malicious insider and develop common themes for miti-
gation. One of the significant findings is the requirement for a comprehensive process
for identifying the level of risk posed by system users [1]. The group devised a concep-
tual framework, depicted in Figure 2.2, consisting of three major components: People,
Tools, and Environment. This workshop became one of the first to address the need
for formal risk analysis for the insider threat.
In 2004, the Advanced Research and Development Activity in Information Tech-
nology (ARDA) devised a six month insider threat challenge workshop. In this collab-
orative effort, experts in computer security met to create analysis methods to counter
malicious insiders in the US intelligence community [26]. Figure 2.3 defines a tax-
onomy of cyber events derived from investigation of previous cases. Based on these
indicators the primary detection strategies in Figure 2.4 were developed: profiling and
data flow analysis (Stealthwatch); likely actions based on established patterns (Struc-
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Figure 2.2: Framework for Insider Threat Risk Analysis Pre-
sented at the C3I/DARPA Workshop [1].
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tured Analysis); correlating inputs from the network application level (Data Fusion);
and false production systems used to lure the malicious insider (Honeynets). These
techniques associate behaviors and identify potential suspects through a Common
Data Repository that sends indicators to the Decision Analysis for a human analyst
to review. The workshop produced significant results using this framework to per-
form real-time detection of simulated malicious insiders on a live network test. The
research and findings demonstrated a requirement for refined risk analysis methods,
an observable taxonomy, and more sophisticated detection algorithms.
2.4.2 Frameworks for Identifying the Insider Threat. The aforementioned
workshops emphasize the need for better identification of individuals that are potential
insider threats. This section further reviews published work that attempts to formalize
a method for identifying these threats.
Schultz devised the framework shown in Figure 2.5 for recognizing insiders
through well-defined characteristics consisting of personality traits, verbal behavior,
correlated usage patterns, preparatory behavior, meaningful errors, and deliberate
markers [34]. His methodology examines these classifiers and determines through
experience the type of attacks that are likely to occur. His belief is the indicators
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Figure 2.5: Insider Threat Framework Developed by Schultz
[34].
can be quantified and expressed using multiple regression formulas and thus predict
the likelihood of an attack. Although Schultz’s methods are unproven, his frame-
work emphasizes the importance of being able to analyze the threat in a measurable
manner.
Wood presents a technique based on knowledge, tactics, and a predictable pro-
cess [43]. He suggests a systematic method for simulating the behavior of the mali-
cious insider by specifying the rationale and attributes of the perpetrator. The way
an incident can be carried out is defined by distinct steps in whereby an individual
is motivated, determines the target, plans the attack, and finally executes the attack.
The insider is assumed to be able to obtain the privileges needed for an attack and
has extensive knowledge of the system. The main problem with these assumptions is
that it limits the scope of possible suspects and may lead to a malicious insider being
overlooked. Additionally, a systematic method is important, but there is no formal
way to analyze Wood’s process. A risk analysis framework should be defined in a
distinct manner that is capable of quantifying an individual’s threat to the system.
Magklaras and Furnell have devised an insider threat prediction tool (ITPT)
that estimates the level of threat based on certain profiles of user behavior [25]. They
define a taxonomy that determines the threat level associated with an individual
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Figure 2.6: Insider Threat Prediction Tool Proposed by Magk-
laras [25].
by classifying users into three basic dimensions: system role, reason of misuse, and
system consequences. A mathematical formula estimates threat levels based on the
three dimensions and particular aspects of insider attributes and behavior. Once a
threat level is identified, the ITPT architecture is defined and uses a variety of system
modules to process and collect data. The collected data from the filesystem, memory
modules, input/output, and hardware devices are delivered to the monitoring module
for collaboration and detection techniques as shown in Figure 2.6. This methodology
views the insider threat at system level and user profile. However, the framework lacks
a practical implementation scheme and does not specifically address the indicators
that produce potential threats. A more complete and formal method of classifying
the risk for an insider threat is needed.
Reiher proposes using Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS) to identify malicious
insiders [30]. ADS characterizes normal pattern usage and identifies behavior that
does not conform to those patterns. Reiher analyzed file access by recording when
a user performed an open, close, read, or write to a file. A time stamp measures
the length of time a file was open and the time the operation occurred. Using the
information gathered on 10 users over a 2-year time period, Reiher created a profile for
what he labeled normal usage. This data was used to train the ADS so any pattern of
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file access that did not match the profile was flagged as suspicious. Reiher tested the
ADS by creating scenarios to see if what he believed to be malicious activities were
identified. Although the research successfully classifies different file accesses, there
needs to be real-world implementation or analysis against case studies to determine if
file access is truly capable of determining malicious behavior. Additionally, while ADS
algorithms are improving they are still susceptible to a high rate of false alarms [24].
Measuring an individual’s usage patterns appear promising at producing indicators,
but the use of this technique alone is likely not enough for system wide risk analysis.
The workshops and published works demonstrate risk analysis for the insider
threat relies heavily on measuring behavior characteristics and access within the sys-
tem. Unfortunately, the current methodologies have not demonstrated effectiveness
through case studies or implementation. Identifying the malicious insider is an in-
herently difficult problem that expands across many areas of expertise such as social,
behavioral, and technical disciplines. Perhaps the solution is in a multidisciplinary
approach, where the factors from each area are leveraged together to produce an
effective risk analysis framework.
2.5 Summary
This chapter reviews the attributes and characteristics of a malicious insider by
investigating some documented case studies and trend analysis. A security model for
the insider threat is discussed along with defining the safety of a system. SPM is also
reviewed to explore characterizing a system in a decidable and quantifiable manner.
Risk analysis frameworks for the insider threat are also discussed. The remainder of
this document explores these concepts to develop a systematic method to address the
insider threat through a formal security model and risk analysis.
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III. Methodolgy
This chapter outlines the methodology used to develop a formal security model and
risk analysis for the insider threat. It provides the necessary information to formalize
the insider threat problem in a systematic and definable manner.
3.1 Problem Definition
This research addresses two specific areas of concern for the insider threat: the
safety of a system and identifying individuals that pose a threat. The process of
analyzing how rights can transfer within the system determines the safety of a system
and can be evaluated through security models. Risk analysis provides a formal means
for identifying individuals that pose a risk to the system.
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
Security Model. There is currently no security model capable of
determining the safety of a system against the insider threat in a quantifiable and
deterministic manner. The first goal of this research is to develop a comprehensive
security model that adequately determines the safety of a system against the insider
threat.
Current mitigation techniques for the insider threat typically focus on the mech-
anisms for preventing or detecting an attack. Examples of these type of systems are
Anomaly Detections Systems, event logs, file access monitoring, and Honeypots. A
security model, however, uses a different strategy: expose weaknesses in the system
before an attack by determining if a state that violates the security policy can be
reached. For example, an organization’s security policy states that only persons in
department Q can access the network drive Z. When a security model of the system
is analyzed, however, it is determined that an individual in department X can obtain
access to the network drive Z. The process has discovered a vulnerability that violates
the security policy and a mechanism is required to prevent the access.
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It is expected that by using SPM as a foundation a formal means to measure
and analyze the safety of a system against the insider threat can be produced. It has
already been demonstrated SPM can be extended to model different conditions and
the safety question is decidable for a system specified in SPM [29]. These attributes
make SPM a formidable candidate for this research.
Risk Analysis. The second goal of this research is to present a risk
analysis framework using a multidisciplinary approach capable of detecting potential
malicious insiders.
Performing risk analysis for the malicious insider is an inherently difficult prob-
lem that transcends social, behavioral, and technical disciplines. Unfortunately, cur-
rent methodologies to combat the insider threat have not proven effective primarily be-
cause techniques have focused on these areas in isolation. The technology community
is searching for technical solutions while the law enforcement and counterintelligence
communities focus on human behavioral characteristics to identify suspicious activ-
ities. These independent methods have limited effectiveness because of the unique
dynamics associated with the insider threat.
This research proposes a multidisciplinary approach with a clearly defined method-
ology that attacks the problem in an organized and consistent manner. The hypothesis
is that focusing on the collaboration of information to determine indicators and using
statistical analysis to identify potential malicious insiders, effective risk analysis for
the insider threat is possible.
3.2 Security Model for the Insider Threat
The model to evaluate the safety of a system against the insider threat is based
on the principles of the original SPM and is referred to as the Schematic Protection
Model for the Insider Threat (SPM-IT). SPM-IT analyzes security policies and imple-
mentation schemes to determine whether vulnerabilities exist. Using this information,
mechanisms can be implemented or policies changed to mitigate the threat.
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A security policy, at the simplest level, defines a set of safe states where dis-
tribution of privileges is consistent with the underlying objectives [32]. For example,
the policy user X cannot read file Y defines a state for the system to maintain safety.
Strict analysis of assigned privileges alone is not sufficient for determining the safety
of a system. The distribution of rights must also be analyzed to ensure the possible
states a system may reach are safe. The dynamic aspect of a security policy may allow
the transfer of rights to result in an unauthorized state. In the previous example, if
X cannot read Y initially but user Z transfers this privilege to X, then the system
has reached an unsafe state. SPM-IT analyzes the dynamic allocation of rights and
determines if transitions lead to an unsafe state in the context of the insider threat.
The safety of a system is an issue in systems that provide controlled sharing of
information among multiple users [32]. The safety question is defined as determining
if a given system with an initial state is safe with respect to a generic right [3]. The
original SPM demonstrates the safety question is decidable and tractable provided the
schema is acyclic and attenuating. The SPM-IT maintains this quality through the
attributes of the SPM and demonstrates the safety question is decidable and tractable
for the insider threat.
3.2.1 Approach. A taxonomy characterizing the insider threat through
measurable and distinct actions is developed. The taxonomy is specified through the
SPM attributes, extending the framework as necessary. The resulting SPM-IT is used
for analysis to determine the safety of a system against the insider threat. Tractable
analysis and implementation of mitigation techniques are demonstrated through one
instance of the model.
3.2.2 Model Boundaries. To ensure the model adequately addresses the in-
sider threat, it is necessary to clearly define the aspects that are encompassed by the
model. An insider is any individual who has been granted any right in an information
system. This description does not limit the insider to specific borders such as Fire-
walls, Routers, or a Local Area Network. The system itself could be a conglomeration
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Figure 3.1: An ACM representation with two subjects and
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of networks. What is important is that once the user has been granted any authorized
right to the information system, they are now considered an insider and are included
in the system protection state.
The protection state is the current state of all rights for all users and objects
in the information system. The protection state encompasses all activities that are
allowed according to organization policy or system access controls. The most precise
model to describe a protection state is the Access Control Matrix (ACM) [3]. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows an ACM with subjects Alice and Bob and their rights to objects File
1 and File 2. Alice has own, read, and write rights over File 1 and is limited to read
for File 2. SPM-IT captures the finite set of rights that can be represented through
the protection state.
The malicious insider is any authorized user that uses rights to alter the system
or the protection state of the system in an unauthorized way. For example, if an
individual gains administrative rights and deletes files, they are a malicious insider.
If an individual not associated with the system physically breaks into a building and
places a packet sniffer somewhere on the network, they are not a malicious insider
because the individual does not have rights on the system. They are more aptly
categorized as a criminal. Physical access alone does not constitute an implied right
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Figure 3.2: Example of Insider Threat Vulnerability.
and does not fall within the scope of this research and should be considered through
different methodology.
3.2.3 Features. SPM-IT provides an ability to determine if a given system
is vulnerable to attacks from malicious insiders. Specifically, it determines if the
exchange of rights between entities can lead to a violation of the security policy.
For example in Figure 3.2 Alice has read permissions over the secure object File X.
Additionally, a communication channel exists between Alice and a public server so
she can write the file to that server. From the public server, Bob can read the secure
object, File X, even though he has no permissions to the protected server. To prevent
this from occurring, the implementation scheme must be changed or a mechanism
required that prevents Alice from writing a protected object to a public server.
3.2.4 Specifications. The model encompasses subjects and objects within a
system along with their associated rights. Subjects are active entities that may per-
form operations (invoke rights) on another subject or object. Objects are considered
passive and do not posses rights. Subjects and objects are assigned a protection type
upon creation that is static.
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Rights within the system are defined through the protection state and represent
the operations that may be performed on subjects and objects. Tickets are the capa-
bilities for the system and are specified through a specific entity and a right associated
with that entity. A subject possessing the ticket X/r is said to have r rights over X.
Ticket transfers may occur provided a link exists between the two entities, the filter
allows the transfer, and the ticket has the copy flag set. Creation of a new entity is
specified through can-create and create-rules.
3.2.5 Analysis. For analysis, a security policy is defined using SPM-IT. The
policy is a simple one with the intention of expressing the effectiveness of SPM-IT in
determining the safety of a system against the insider threat. Once defined through
the SPM-IT, the system is analyzed to determine how tickets can transfer between
subjects.
By design, analysis is performed using a worse-case scenario with respect to
ticket transfer and possession. If a subject is capable of transferring a ticket, the
ticket is transferred. Additionally, if a ticket is possessed by a subject, the subject
will invoke the right.
The maximal state is the state which represents all possible ticket transfers.
Analysis of the maximal state demonstrates where vulnerabilities exist in a system’s
policy and is used to determine the safety of a system. Mitigation techniques are then
specified to demonstrate methods for eliminating or reducing the vulnerabilities.
3.3 Risk Analysis for the Insider Threat
The second goal of this research develops a risk analysis framework. For the
insider threat, the concern is identifying individuals that display symptoms consistent
with a malicious insider. By identifying these individuals, risk analysis prevents them
from causing significant damage or more harm to the organization.
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In the case studies reviewed in Chapter II, each individual had suspicious activ-
ities in the form of behavioral and technical attributes. Identifying these attributes in
a comprehensive manner provides a means to perform risk analysis against the threat.
3.3.1 Approach. In this research, the Multidisciplinary Approach to Miti-
gating the Insider Threat (MAMIT) is the framework designed to perform risk analysis
for the insider threat. Relevant indicators are identified by leveraging both behavioral
and technical attributes. These indicators are quantified and combined to produce
one threat level for each person in the system. The threat level for each individual is
measured against the others in the organization to identify users that pose a threat.
If an individual falls outside the acceptable statistic threat range, they are identified
as a potential insider threat. The effectiveness of MAMIT is demonstrated using the
well-known case study involving Robert Hanssen.
3.3.2 Specifications. An insider is any individual who has been granted
access in an information system. Risk analysis identifies insiders that are planning
to commit or have committed a malicious act against the organization using their
rights. Indicators are the behavior and technical attributes produced by individuals
within the system. Individuals that pose a risk exhibit a higher threat level than
other users which if analyzed correctly can be identified through the indicators. Be-
havior indicators are the actions and the conduct of an individual such as financial
activities or coworker interaction. Technical indicators are associated with usage of
the system such as file accesses or document transfers. The consistent measurement
and quantifying of indicators provides a formal method to identify potential threats
using the MAMIT framework.
3.3.3 Attributes. The behavior attributes which produce relevant indicators
are determined through analysis of historical case studies. The 150 case studies in the
PERSEREC database [12] in conjunction with the Guidelines for Security Clearance
[38] establish indicators that are most common and the best determinants consistent
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with past malicious insiders. Technical attributes are determined through ability and
opportunity of a user within the system.
The indicators necessary for measuring risk against the insider threat are iden-
tified within the context of the MAMIT framework. The indicators are assigned a
quantitative value based on the perceived threat level of an individual for each specific
indicator. The indicators are combined to produce a single identifier for risk analysis.
The process is performed for each individual within the organization. Statistical anal-
ysis using the t-distribution and prediction interval determines an acceptable threat
range for the organization. Anyone with a threat level not within the acceptable range
is labelled a potential insider threat.
3.3.4 Analysis. The MAMIT framework identifies individuals that display
a credible threat to the system. MAMIT is evaluated using the Robert Hanssen case
study. Since the case study is well-documented and widely publicized, it is an effective
candidate for analyzing the framework. The indicators are determined through doc-
umentation review and applied appropriately to the MAMIT framework. Statistical
analysis within the framework specifies Hanssen’s threat level in conjunction with an
acceptable organization threat level. The study analyzes if Hanssen would likely have
been identified using the MAMIT process.
3.4 Evaluation
Evaluation of both the security model and risk analysis is performed through
analytical methods. SPM-IT is a theoretical model that examines the flow of rights
within a system. Through the specified rules and enforcing the logical principles of
the model, the correctness of the state transitions can be evaluated. Provided the flow
of rights follow the principles and safety is assessed based on the definitions within
SPM-IT, each instance of the model can be verified.
The MAMIT framework is a risk analysis process determined by quantifying
identifiers and through statistical analysis. The principles and implementation of
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MAMIT is validated through expert intuition. If an individual is a known malicious
insider from a historical case, then the framework should identify him as an insider
threat.
3.5 Summary
This chapter defines the methods used to develop a security model and risk
analysis framework for the insider threat. The principles for analyzing a security
policy and implementation scheme to determine the safety of a system are introduced.
The development of SPM-IT by extending attributes of the original SPM is discussed.
Additionally, a process for determining individuals within the organization that pose a
threat is presented through a multidisciplinary risk analysis framework. The aspect of
determining indicators through behavior and technical attributes is discussed. Finally,
the analysis and evaluation techniques for the developed model and framework are
presented.
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IV. Developing a Security Model for the Insider Threat
This chapter presents a formal security model for the insider threat. Initially, a
taxonomy is created that systematically defines the threat. The taxonomy is applied
to the framework of SPM to develop the Schematic Protection Model for the Insider
Threat (SPM-IT). An implementation of the model instantiates the safety analysis of
a system and effectiveness of SPM-IT.
4.1 Taxonomy Development
To specify the insider threat through a security model the threat must be iden-
tified in a systematic, measurable manner. This requires a comprehensive taxonomy
capable of classifying malicious insider activities. The taxonomy developed for this
research decomposes an abstract threat into a solvable and analyzable process.
4.1.1 Approach. To develop a taxonomy for the insider threat, attack tree
methodologies were examined. Researchers have proposed an attack tree is sufficient
to address the outside threat and assess the security of a system against a compromise
[20,27,37]. The attack tree structure places the goal of the attacker in the root node
and different ways to obtain that goal depicted as leaf nodes.
Traditional attack trees, however, are not capable of capturing the insider threat
effectively [7] since they do not provide a comprehensive model to reason about vul-
nerabilities [9]. One of the more significant problems is an insider may already have
the rights needed to perform a malicious act. Additionally, the focus of the attack
tree is obtaining a goal represented by the root node. Quantifying goals or motives
of an attacker is difficult and still may not lead to an adequate representation of the
threat.
Malicious insiders do not share a common profile, so there must be a different
tangible way to produce a taxonomy if measurable results are to be obtained [29]. This
research proposes a hierarchical tree capable of providing a malicious insider taxonomy
using a systems engineering approach rather than the goal oriented objectives used
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by attack trees. This representation focuses on the activities of the malicious insider
and not their traits or attributes.
To represent a threat, actions that can lead to a violation of the protection
state are identified. These activities are methodically investigated through functional
decomposition, which addresses the problems associated with traditional attack trees.
By decomposing actions with respect to the protection state, no user or threat is
excluded. Additionally, an action either occurs or it doesn’t so the methodology is
measurable and analyzable. This systematic approach masks differences inherent with
individuals and effectively classifies malicious behavior.
4.1.2 Methodology. The protection state defines through rights what actions
are authorized within the system. The Access Control Matrix (ACM) is the classic
representation of a protection state and defines operations through the finite set of
actions [17]:
• Enter a right
• Delete a right
• Create a subject or object
• Destroy a subject or object
Consider the ACM in Figure 4.1. The right can be entered into the matrix to
allow Alice write File 2. Removal or deletion of read File 1 from Bob is possible as
well. File 2 can also be removed (destroyed). From a malicious standpoint, these
actions can be performed by a subject to intentionally alter the protection state.
Additionally, in the system represented by this example Alice can invoke read File 1
and potentially obtain unauthorized information. Alice may also grant write to Bob
for File 1 because she is the owner.
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File 1 File 2 Alice Bob
Alice
own
read
write
read
own
read
write
Bob read
own
read
write
own
read
write
Figure 4.1: An ACM representation with two subjects and
two objects.
The insider threat taxonomy is specified through the actions that can result in
malicious activity in the context of the protection state. These activities have been
categorized into four distinct actions:
1. Invoke right to obtain unauthorized information (Snooping)
2. Enter right to gain unauthorized privileges (Elevation)
3. Delete or change a subject or objects rights, to include destroy a subject or
object (Alteration)
4. Transfer a right to an unauthorized entity (Distribution)
Each activity is unauthorized if it violates organization policy or system access
controls. These actions capture the possible malicious events that can produce a
transition in the protection state. The malicious insider is therefore someone who
violates the protection state of the system and is depicted in Figure 4.2 as the root
node of the tree.
Alteration. Alteration occurs when a malicious insider changes a
subject or object’s rights in an unauthorized manner. A user deleting a file from the
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Malicious
Insider
Alteration Distribution Snooping Elevation
ACTIONS
Figure 4.2: The four actions represented in the first hierarchy
of the tree.
system to deny access or launching a virus that corrupts entities on the system is an
example of Alteration.
Distribution. Distribution is the transfer of rights to an unau-
thorized entity. This occurs when a user has appropriate system rights and a need to
know to access a file but transfers it to an unauthorized entity. A user emailing a file
to an unauthorized individual is an example of Distribution.
Snooping. Snooping occurs when a legitimate right is used to
obtain unauthorized information on a user or object. This action is similar to Distri-
bution except the user has appropriate system rights but lacks a need to know. The
violation takes place when a user has permissions according to system access controls
but the event violates organization policy. For example, an individual with adminis-
trative privileges is Snooping when he opens and reads another user’s email to gain
information. He has accessed something allowed according to the rights possessed but
organization policy disallows it.
Elevation. Elevation takes place when a user obtains unautho-
rized rights in the system. A classic example of this is unauthorized acquisition of
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administrative privileges. There are many different ways a malicious insider may ac-
complish this, from automated attacks to social engineering. Elevation addresses the
notion of a malicious insider changing their rights and is an attempt to garner rights
that are not already allowed by the system.
4.1.3 Example. The taxonomy created using functional decomposition en-
sures every activity of the malicious insider can be categorized in the context of the
protection state. This establishes the underlying framework needed to identify a ma-
licious insider in a deterministic fashion. That each activity can be captured by a
specific action is an important and definitive concept.
It is best to explore this notion through a practical example. If Mallory gains
administrator privileges by compromising a system and proceeds to delete Alice’s
email account, transitions in the protection state occur. Mallory is a malicious in-
sider because her activities are intentional and deliberate. In this scenario there are
two distinct actions that violate the protection state and subsequently there are two
transitions of the protection state. The initial violation is Elevation by gaining admin-
istrator rights. The second violation is Alteration by deleting an email account and
changing the system structure. Additionally, if Mallory accesses a secure document
another violation occurs. Initially, when she gains administrator privileges through
Elevation the protection state allows her access to the file. Although she now has these
rights in the context of the protection state, Snooping has occurred because she still
does not have an authorized reason (need to know) to view the file. Finally, if Mallory
shares the document with Bob, Distribution has occurred because Bob has obtained
rights to an object he shouldn’t have. Thus, the problem is compartmentalized into
distinct events.
4.1.4 Decomposition. Figure 4.3 demonstrates how to further decompose a
malicious insider’s activities. The threats are broken down step by step, beginning
with the actions and continuing with the intermediate levels to the leaf node. This
process is accomplished using a “how it can be performed” relationship between a
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Intermediate
Node
Intermediate
Node
Intermediate
Node
Intermediate
NodeTool Tool
Tool ToolTool
Figure 4.3: Decomposed tree representation.
parent and child node. The leaf node is the lowest level of abstraction and is the tool
or technique the malicious insider uses to accomplish the activity. A path from the
malicious insider (root node) to a tool (leaf node) forms a completely decomposed
activity. The model is developed in an hierarchical acyclic fashion, meaning a ma-
licious activity can only follow one specific path from the root node to a leaf node.
This indicates that any activity is capable of being explicitly defined.
The following example uses this methodology for the Distribution action shown
in Figure 4.4. The Distribution action can be performed through file sharing, via
email, copying the file to storage media, online chat, or an electronic drop box. Send-
ing email can be accomplished through a local or web based account. In addition,
copying the file to storage can be performed by floppy disk, CD-ROM or USB drive.
Actions are limited to four distinct possibilities (Distribution, Snooping, Eleva-
tion, Alteration). The intermediate nodes, however, can use any number of children to
describe its parent. This notion allows flexibility to tailor threats to the policies and
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Figure 4.4: An example decomposing Distribution: file shar-
ing.
specific environment of an individual organization, while still providing an analyzable
and decidable taxonomy.
4.1.5 Taxonomy Attributes. The fundamental strength of this taxonomy is
expressing the malicious insider through distinct actions capable of being decomposed
and analyzed. It is a complete and well-defined representation of the insider threat
because it defines actions and does not categorize individual attributes. Defining
an attack using functional decomposition enables formal classification of the insider
threat. This taxonomy is a systematic representation that can be applied to the
development of analytical processes and security models.
4.2 SPM-IT
SPM-IT uses the original SPM, but extends it by incorporating the ability to
model the insider threat using the above taxonomy and representing actions in the
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context of the model. This formalization provides a framework to analyze the safety
of a system and determine vulnerabilities of a given policy or scheme.
4.2.1 Rights. The original SPM specified two types of rights, control and
inert. The purpose was to distinguish between rights that affect the protection state
of a system (control rights) and those that do not (inert). For example, the read
right is considered an inert right because reading a file does not change what entities
have access to the document, and thus have no effect on the protection state [3].
Control rights, however, can alter the protection state. Because of this, SPM focuses
on how control rights can be transferred between different entities. The insider threat,
however, poses a different problem. Malicious activity can occur through both inert
and control rights. For example, Snooping can occur by reading a file. By definition,
for the insider threat this action is a violation of the protection state. For this reason,
SPM-IT makes no distinction between the different types of rights and uses both for
analysis.
In SPM-IT the two rights, read(r) and write(w), are used extensively to capture
the actions associated with the insider threat. The right, r, indicates the ability to
read an entity. The w right confers the ability to modify or delete an existing entity.
These two rights are distinct and a subject is not required to have one to invoke the
other.
Creating a duplicate of a subject or object is achieved through the combination
of r and the can-create (cc) function. This functionality is referred to as the save as
operation and is possible if a subject possesses r for a specific entity and cc for the
subject includes the specified type of the entity.
Definition 1 (save as operation). Dom(X) is the set of tickets possessed by
Subject X. The creation of a replica of Subject or Object Y is possible iff:
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1. Y/r ∈ Dom(X),
2. τ(Y) ∈ cc(τ(X))
The resulting entity from the save as operation is indicated by ′. For example, in the
context of Definition 1, Y′ is a copy of Y.
4.2.2 Actions. One of the benefits of the taxonomy is it encompasses the
insider threat according to the types of actions that may occur to violate the protection
state. These four distinct actions are now defined within the framework of SPM to
characterize malicious activity. The representation of these four actions form the
basis of SPM-IT and can be used to determine the safety of a policy or given scheme
against the insider threat.
Alteration. This action encompasses modifying the information
system structure in an unauthorized manner. Alteration occurs when a user mali-
ciously changes a subject or object from one state to another. By definition, any
subject that contains a ticket with w rights over another subject or object can per-
form an act of alteration.
Definition 2 (Alteration). Alteration can occur to Y by X iff:
1. Y/w ∈ Dom(X)
Snooping. This action obtains unauthorized information about a
subject or object using legitimate access controls. The threat exists when a user has
rights to perform the action, but should not because it violates organization policy.
Snooping can occur whenever a subject has r rights over a subject or object.
Definition 3 (Snooping). Snooping can occur to Y by X iff:
1. Y/r ∈ Dom(X)
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Distribution. This action transfers protected information and oc-
curs when an unauthorized right is granted to a subject. Distribution occurs through
the transfer of a ticket to an unauthorized subject or by creating a copy and distribut-
ing a ticket for the copy.
Definition 4a (Distribution). Let Subject U be an unauthorized subject and
q be a generic right. Distribution of Y/q by X can occur when all of the following
requirements are met:
1. Y/q :c ∈ Dom(X)
2. linki(X,U)=true
3. τ(Y)/q ∈ fi(τ(X),τ(U))
For Distribution to occur, the subject must possess a ticket with a right for the target
subject or object that contains the copy flag, a link must exist between the subject and
unauthorized subject, and the filter must allow the ticket transfer from the subject
to the unauthorized subject as shown in Figure 4.5.
A second way for Distribution to occur is for the subject to create a copy of the
target entity using save as and distribute a ticket for the newly created copy. In this
situation, the unauthorized subject gains a ticket for the replica and not the original.
Definition 4b (Distribution of a copy). Distribution of Y′/q by X can occur
when all of the following requirements are met:
1. Y/r ∈ Dom(X)
2. τ(Y) ∈ cc(τ(X))
3. τ(Y)/q :c ∈ cr(τ(X),τ(Y))
4. linki(X,U)=true
5. τ(Y)/q ∈ fi(τ(X),τ(U))
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Dom(X)= {Y/q:c}
Object Y
Subject X
f1(τ(X), τ(U)) = T x R
Figure 4.5: Distribution.
where the create-rule (cr) specifies the rights generated for the new entity after the cc
function is invoked. The ticket Y/r in the domain of X and the cc function permits X
to create a replica. Distribution can occur if a copy flag is included in cr, a link exists
between the subject and unauthorized subject, and the filter allows the transfer as
shown in Figure 4.6.
Distribution through association. The transfer of a ticket
to an unauthorized subject can also occur through a combination of Alteration and
Snooping even if no link exists between two subjects. That is, these two independent
actions performed in conjunction can lead to an unauthorized ticket transfer. The
threat as a whole is formally classified through Distribution. In this situation the
unauthorized subject obtains a ticket for a replica and not the original entity.
Definition 4c (Distribution through association). Let Z be a Subject or Ob-
ject. Distribution of Y′/q via X can occur when all of the following requirements are
met:
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Dom(X)= 
{Y/r, Y’/q:c}
Object Y
Subject X
f1(τ(X), τ(U)) = T x R
save as
Object Y’
Figure 4.6: Distribution of a copy.
1. Y/r ∧ Z/w ∈ Dom(X)
2. τ(Y) ∈ cc(τ(X))
3. Z/r ∈ Dom(U)
The ticket Y/r in the Domain of X coupled with the cc function allows X to perform
a save as function. Additionally, X has the capability for Alteration to Z through
the ticket Z/w. Together, these conditions allow X to effectively replace Z with a
copy of Y. Once Z has been altered to match the original Y, U can invoke Z/r and
obtain a replica of Y. This results in U performing Snooping by using granted rights
to gain access to unauthorized information. The ability to gain a capability through
Alteration followed by Snooping results in Distribution as shown in Figure 4.7.
Elevation. Elevation takes place when a user acquires unautho-
rized rights. This action implies some protection mechanism has been compromised
to obtain the new ticket. Fundamentally, this threat is concerned with the security of
a system and refers to the actual implementation of mitigation techniques [3]. Safety,
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Dom(X)= {Y/r, Z/w}
Object Y
Subject X
Object Z
Dom(U)= {Z/r}
save as Y’
Figure 4.7: Distribution through association.
on the other hand, is an abstract model of the system and represents states the system
can reach with respect to rights. It is possible for a system to be safe with respect to
all rights but implementation of the system is not secure. For example, if the system
is safe and rights cannot leak to unauthorized individuals but it can be exploited
using a buffer overflow, the system is considered safe but the implementation of the
system is not secure. Because SPM-IT analyzes the safety of a system, Elevation is
not modeled and is a threat only if the system is not implemented in a secure manner.
4.2.3 Ticket Use and Transfer. There are subtle differences between how
different vulnerabilities arise. Both Alteration and Snooping invoke a ticket. This
means to prevent these threats, the focus should be on eliminating possession of the
rights or ensuring they can only be invoked correctly. In contrast to those actions,
Distribution occurs through the transfer of tickets. To mitigate this action, techniques
on preventing the unauthorized flow of tickets between subjects is needed.
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4.3 Analysis
This section applies SPM-IT and analyzes an implementation. The scheme con-
sidered expresses the power of the SPM-IT framework and demonstrates the process
of determining the safety of a system using the model. Because SPM-IT preserves
the generality and tractable analysis of the original SPM, the methodology can be
extended to model more complex policies and systems.
4.3.1 Policy and Implementation. The scenario models a university setting
where there are professors, students, and system administrators. Professors have
access to a file server for professors as well as a common file server. Students have
access to a student file server and also the common file server. The administrators have
full control over the professors, students, and all servers. The rights are r which allows
read and w which allows modify or delete for the associated subject or object. The
organization policy states that users may only access files on their respective servers
and the common server. Additionally, access should only occur if the information
is required to perform their duty. Professors, students, and administrators have the
capability to communicate through email. Through inheritance, a subject with a
ticket for a server also assumes the ticket for all of the files on that server. For
example, presenting the ticket for the shared file server automatically allows access
to any file on that server. Formally, the policy is defined as follows:
1. TS = {Prof, Stu, Admin}, TO = {server, file}
2. R = {r :c, w :c}
3. link1(P, S) = true
link2(P, A) = true
link3(S, P) = true
link4(S, A) = true
link5(A, P) = true
link6(A, S) = true
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4. f 1(Prof, Stu) = T × R
f 2(Prof, Admin) = T × R
f 3(Stu, Prof) = T × R
f 4(Stu, Admin) = T × R
f 5(Admin, Prof) = T × R
f 6(Admin, Stu) = T × R
5. cc(Prof) = {file}
cc(Stu) = {file}
cc(Admin) = {Admin, Prof, Stu, server, file}
6. cr(Prof, file) = {file/rw :c}
cr(Stu, file) = {file/rw :c}
cr(Admin, Admin) = {self/rw :c} | {Admin/rw :c}
cr(Admin, Prof) = {Prof/rw :c} | ∅
cr(Admin, Stu) = {Stu/rw :c} | ∅
cr(Admin, server) = {server/rw :c}
cr(Admin, file) = {file/rw :c}
The filters currently do not block any transfer through the links, which is a typical
implementation scheme for most organizations. Additionally, the can-create function
and create-rules specify an owner-based policy that allows each subject to create a
file and retain control over the file.
This example for a policy is basic by design. Even so, it demonstrates the power
and effectiveness of SPM-IT through a scenario similar to circumstances exploited by
malicious insiders. For analysis, one instance of each subject and object are exam-
ined to determine the capabilities and type of threats in the implementation scheme.
These entities are:
τ(P) = Prof
τ(S) = Stu
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Figure 4.8: Initial State.
τ(A) = Admin
τ(server p) = τ(server s) = τ(server z) = server
τ(file p1) = τ(file s1) = τ(file z1) = file
Figure 4.8 shows the initial state of the system. Notice the administrator possesses
a copy flag for each ticket. This is indicative of a typical scheme that allows the
administrator to have full control over the entities within the system. The copy flag
permits the transfer of tickets to other entities, for example an administrator assigning
a subject privileges to an object.
4.3.2 Alteration Threat. The scheme is now analyzed for the Alteration
vulnerabilities. Subjects P and A are currently the only ones with the ability to
perform Alteration on file p1 (cf., Definition 2). Suppose file p1 is a critical asset
that cannot be modified. To prevent Alteration, a policy change or mechanism would
have to be implemented to eliminate the ticket server p/w for P and A. Additionally, if
file p1 has been altered, forensic analysis of the model can demonstrate what subjects
47
are capable of performing that action. The subjects that possess the capability for
Alteration, as well as the other threats, will likely change through the transfer of
tickets. The implications of performing threat analysis for the systems where tickets
are transferred are discussed in detail in the maximal state section.
4.3.3 Snooping Threat. Using file p1 again, both P and A have the ca-
pability for Snooping (cf., Definition 3). By examining the model, an analyst can
determine the subjects that have a valid reason for accessing the object. It is likely
that P has a legitimate requirement for accessing the file and the vulnerability for the
system exists through access via A. This example demonstrates the power of the sys-
tem administrator that is prevalent in most systems. Snooping is generally a threat
for administrators because they typically have access to the files but do not neces-
sarily have a need to know for the information contained in the file. To eliminate or
minimize the threat, a mandatory access control policy or mitigation technique must
be implemented that reduces the span of control of the administrator.
4.3.4 Distribution Threat. Figure 4.9 demonstrates the threat to the system
through Distribution (cf., Definition 4a). Subject A can transfer a copy of the ticket
server p/rw to S because A has the copy flag, a link exists, and the filter allows the
operation. This transfer is synonymous with an administrator granting a student
rights to the server.
A threat also exists for Distribution of a copy (cf., Definition 4b). Subject P
uses save as to create a local file, file p1′. P retains full rights to the new object
through the owner-based policy specifications in the create rules. Using the existing
connection between P and S, a ticket for file p1′ can be transferred. Figure 4.10 shows
this transfer and how S can receive a ticket for a replica of the unauthorized object.
In this situation, the violation can be generalized by a professor saving the file to his
local machine and then using the email link to send the file to a student. At this
point, the student now has the capability through save as function to create a local
copy of the file if desired.
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Figure 4.9: Distribution threat.
save as
Dom(A) = 
{server_p/rw:c,
server_s/rw:c, 
server_z/rw:c, 
P/rw:c, S/rw:c}server_z
server_p
server_s
file_p1’
Dom(P) = 
{server_p/rw,server_z/rw, 
file_p1’/rw:c}
Dom(S) = 
{server_s/rw,server_z/rw, 
file_p1’/r}
file_s1
file_p1
file_z1
Figure 4.10: Distribution threat using a copy.
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Figure 4.11: Distribution threat through association.
The final risk for Distribution occurs through association (cf., Definition 4c).
Figure 4.11 shows the threat of Distribution for file p1 by P. P can use cc and file p1/r
to save as. Instead of saving locally, however, P stores the new file to server z by
virtue of the ticket server z/w. S can access the replica file, file p1′, by invoking
server z/r and S has now violated organization policy by obtaining access to a copy
of an unauthorized file.
4.3.5 Maximal State. Examining each threat based on its initial state
demonstrates how to analyze the system against various actions. The safety of the
system, however, is determined by analyzing the events that can occur in a worse-case
scenario. The maximal state is reached when all tickets that can be transferred have
been transferred. The maximal state for an arbitrary system is not finite because more
entities can be added through can-create. However, the safety question is decidable
if the schema is acyclic and attenuating [32].
The first step in determining the maximal state is to identify how tickets can
flow between subjects. In SPM-IT, this is accomplished via Distribution. Figure 4.12
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Figure 4.12: Maximal State.
demonstrates a maximal state for the university setting being discussed. The results
are intuitive and easily derived through Distribution (cf., Definition 4a), in which A
can transfer every ticket to both P and S. This confirms the power of an administrator.
Once a maximal state has been determined, the system can be examined for
other threats. S can perform Alteration on file p1, file s1, file z1, and P. S can also
perform Snooping on file s1. The remaining threats for each subject can be obtained
by applying the definitions for the actions. To mitigate these threats, a policy or
implementation scheme that prevents the ticket transfers and reduces the risks asso-
ciated with the other actions is needed.
4.3.6 Mitigating the Threats. This section demonstrates how mitigation
policies can be modeled through SPM-IT to minimize the threat to a system.
Two-Person Integrity. Two-person integrity reduces the threat
of Alteration and Snooping by prohibiting access to an object unless allowed by two
authorized subjects. This makes it much more difficult for one subject to compromise
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a file and can be implemented using a technique such as cryptographic secret sharing
[35]. Cryptographic secret sharing encrypts a file and distributes unique keys to
authorized subjects. To decrypt the file, a given number of subjects must present
their key. If less than the required number of individuals present a key, it will not
decrypt.
Thus, any attempt to invoke r or w requires the approval of another authorized
subject. For the insider threat, this process imposes a check and balance system that
forces a malicious insider to collude with another individual. For additional strength,
the system could be set to randomly pick the second individual from the list of those
authorized. This would force a malicious insider to potentially have to conspire with
everyone that has access to the file.
Figure 4.13 is an implementation of the two-person integrity scheme. To specify
the policy, additional subjects and rights have been introduced into the system:
1. TS = {Prof, Stu, Admin, Verification Authority}, TO = {server, file}
2. R = {r :c, w :c, x , q}
3. cc(Verification Authority) = ∅
τ(V) = Verification Authority
The right x is execute and q is query. To obtain file z1/r, P first must invoke V/x.
The verification authority queries S for approval of the operation. If approved, V
transfers file z1/r to P. This reduces Snooping because another subject must approve
the access. For w, if the operation is approved V will perform a write on behalf of
the initiator. This prevents a subject with direct access from modifying the object.
Alteration can still take place, but would require collusion.
Restricting File Copy. Although two-person integrity reduces
the risk of Snooping and Alteration, a Distribution threat still exists. P can obtain
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file_z1
server_z
Dom(S) = 
{V/x}
Dom(P) = 
{V/x}
Dom(V) = 
{server_z/r:cw,
P/q,S/q}
Figure 4.13: Two-Person Integrity Mitigation Scheme.
approval to access file z1 and then use save as to create a local copy. Based on the
current policy, P can disseminate a ticket for the replica to an unauthorized entity.
One way to prevent this is to alter can-create to eliminate the ability to create a file.
In practice, this could be accomplished using display terminals that do not have the
ability to save any information. For some the impact of this may be unacceptable. In
a classified environment, however, the consequences of losing information may be so
great that this is a viable solution.
Separation of Duty. It is evident that a system administrator
poses a significant risk. To minimize the threat, a technique must be implemented to
reduce the span of control. One such technique is separation of duty.
Figure 4.14 is an example of the system using separation of duty. In the new
system, two additional administrators have been added. The scope of each adminis-
trator is now limited to a specific area. For example, A2 only possesses the ability to
administer the part of the system associated with the professor. The rationale behind
this process is to limit the amount of damage that can be caused by one entity to
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server_z/rw}
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{server_p/rw:c, 
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{server_z/rw:c}
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file_p1
file_s1
Figure 4.14: Separation of Duty Mitigation Technique.
a smaller area. To enforce this policy filters must be added to restrict the ability of
administrators to transfer tickets.
New Maximal State. Two-person integrity, restricting file copy,
and separation of duty are mitigation strategies to reduce the threat to the system.
The final policy with all of these changes is specified in Appendix A. Figure 4.15
shows this new policy. A1 has the capability to administer server z and V1. The
filters, however, only allow V1/x to be transferred to other subjects. Similarly, A2 can
administer server p, V2, and P. The transfer of tickets is also limited, only allowing
V2/x to P. The transfer of tickets between P and S is allowed, however, this does
not pose a threat because neither subject is capable of transferring an unauthorized
right since they cannot gain access to an object with the copy flag and do not have
can-create capability to perform a save as operation.
The policy can be examined through ticket transfer to determine the new max-
imal state. Based on the rules set by the new policy, the only change from the initial
state is S has the capability to read server z and server s, P has the capability to read
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Figure 4.15: Implementation of Mitigation Techniques.
server z and server p, A2 has the capability to read server z, and A3 has the capa-
bility to read server z. Using the mitigation techniques, the implementation scheme
closely mirrors the policy originally described. Professors only have access to files on
the professor file server and common file server, and students only have access to files
on the student file server and the common file server.
Further analysis of the scheme shows that some vulnerabilities are present in
the system. The initial policy stated access should only occur if the information is
required to perform their duty. A1 can still perform Snooping and Alteration on
server z and V1. The other administrators also have this ability in their respective
areas. Even so, the threat has been compartmentalized and the risk to the system
has been reduced.
4.4 Summary
This chapter introduces a formal methodology for modelling the insider threat.
A taxonomy is developed that defines the threat through measurable and analyz-
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able actions. The taxonomy is used to specify the threats to a system through the
Schematic Protection Model for the Insider Threat. A process is demonstrated for an-
alyzing a policy and implementation scheme using SPM-IT. Finally, the effectiveness
of mitigation techniques are demonstrated through the attributes of the model.
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V. Risk Analysis for Detecting Malicious Insiders
The previous chapter focuses on analyzing the safety of a system through a secu-
rity model for the insider threat. This chapter examines the security of a system by
developing a risk analysis framework to identify individuals that may pose a threat
to the system. An attack cycle is first discussed to demonstrate the behavior and
technical attributes that produce indicators. The risk analysis framework, a Multi-
disciplinary Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat (MAMIT), is presented and
its effectiveness is demonstrated through the well-known case study involving Robert
Hanssen.
5.1 Attack Cycle
To effectively develop mitigation techniques and prevention methods, it is im-
portant to first examine the attributes associated with the insider threat. The follow-
ing four conditions are the characteristics identified as generally required before an
individual betrays their organization and commits a malicious act [19]:
• An opportunity to commit the crime
• A motive or need for satisfying themselves through the crime
• An ability to overcome natural inhibitions
• A trigger that sets the betrayal in motion
Two primary elements are required for a person to become a malicious insider:
opportunity and motive. If either is missing, the individual does not pose a serious
threat to the organization. For example, if an individual has high motivation to per-
form malicious behavior but no access to the system, then their current likelihood of
being a credible insider threat is low. Additionally, if an executive within the orga-
nization has high access but no motivation to perform malicious behavior, then their
current likelihood is also low. The motive and opportunity factors together provide
an indication to the threat level existing for an individual. Before an insider acts,
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Figure 5.1: Attack cycle for the insider threat.
however, their threat level must be great enough to overcome the natural inhibitions
to commit criminal behavior. Some of the reasons that typically prevent people from
acting include moral values, loyalty to employer or co-workers, or fear of being caught.
Once the threat level increases enough to overcome the inhibitions, an event or oc-
currence usually takes place that pushes the individual over the edge and leads to the
actual betrayal. The activity triggering the attack can be a work related incident,
personal crisis, threat of force, or other event in an individual’s life.
Once the attack occurs, the individual evaluates how well the compromise went.
This step forms the final phase of the attack cycle. Figure 5.1, the attack cycle for
the insider threat, defines the anatomy of an attack. Each area is now discussed in
more detail.
5.1.1 Opportunity. Opportunity for the insider can present itself through
granted permissions, compromise of the system, or inadequate enforcement of orga-
nizational policies. The number of privileges assigned or gained within the system
directly correlates with the amount of damage possible. For example, the system
administrator poses a significant risk to the system because of their level of access
and opportunity. In some compromises, a malicious insider gains access through a
more privileged account. In other cases, the person simply uses permissions granted
them to carry out the compromise. These types of attacks emphasize the importance
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of enforcing sound security polices for users as well as maintaining systems (and their
security mechanisms) up-to-date and patched.
5.1.2 Motives. In 2001, the Defense Personnel Security Research Center
(PERSEREC) performed a study using open source information on 150 espionage
cases to determine trends and patterns associated with the malicious insider [18].
The findings identified motivating factors associated with the criminals, with the
number one motivator being money. Also cited as motives were divided loyalties, a
grudge against the employer, desire to please someone else, coercion, thrill seeking,
and recognition.
Additionally, Dr. Mike Gelles of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service clas-
sified motivators for insiders into two personality disorders commonly found in spies:
antisocial personality disorder and narcissism [15]. Individuals with antisocial person-
ality disorder lack remorse or guilt when they do something wrong. These individuals
reject established rules, are manipulative, self-serving, and seek immediate gratifica-
tion of their desires. They typically have no interest for the future and are more
concerned with immediate gains. People with narcissism usually suffer from excessive
self importance or preoccupation and have difficulty living up to their own expecta-
tions. These individuals normally feel underappreciated by their supervisors and are
unable to accept criticism or failure, because it threatens their inflated self-image.
The characteristics for both of these disorders can produce a high threat level for
someone to commit a malicious activity and are a serious security concern.
5.1.3 Threat, Trigger, and Attack. As mentioned previously, the combi-
nation of opportunity and motives results in an individual’s threat level. Although
most individuals within an organization have an opportunity and a financial or per-
sonal motive to attack, betrayal is relatively rare because the threat level is not high
enough to overcome a person’s natural inhibition [19]. In those instances where a
person performs a malicious act, their individual threat level has become so elevated
that the inhibitions no longer prevent the attack from occurring. Upon reaching this
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level, some event in their personal or professional life typically triggers the act of
betrayal. Herbig et al. discovered that in one-fourth of the cases reviewed an attacker
experiences a life crisis such as divorce, death of a loved one, or failed love affair in
the months preceding the attacks [18]. A serious financial loss or political event also
provides a possible trigger ultimately causing a person to act on their threat level.
The type of attacks occurring range from destructive actions to information theft.
5.1.4 Post Compromise. After attack completion, a period of post com-
promise follows. During this time, the malicious insider may attempt to cover their
tracks, sell the information, or create back doors in the system for future compro-
mises. The individual also evaluates the success of the attack. A successful attack
may lead to increased confidence and the reassurance of the ability to get away with
their actions. An unsuccessful attack does not necessarily mean they were discovered,
but could simply be the failure to obtain the appropriate information or finish the
attack. Either of these results produces a change in the malicious insider’s motives
and/or opportunity. With success, motivation may increase because of a pay off or
self-satisfaction. A failed attempt may also enhance motivation due to a sense of
desperation or desire to complete the attack. Opportunity may increase if the system
is compromised and privileges are elevated. The effect of a successful or unsuccessful
attack on an individual’s motives and opportunity effectively changes their threat
level, thus creating an attack cycle. The goal of the security community is to detect
the malicious insider as early in this cycle as possible.
5.1.5 Indicators. Throughout the attack cycle, the malicious insider pro-
duces characteristics that are capable of being observed. These characteristics in the
form of behavior attributes or technical activities are indicators that can identify a
potential insider threat.
Traditionally, law enforcement and counterintelligence communities look for be-
havior indicators when identifying suspicious activities. These indicators typically
relate to an insider’s actions or motives, such as sudden increase in spending, sus-
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picious travel plans, withdrawal from co-workers and changes in personal life. On
the other hand, the technology community is searching for methods for identifying
technical indicators. Technical indicators are independent of characteristics and in-
stead focus on the capabilities, or opportunities, within the system. A few examples
include an attempt to compromise an administrator’s password, bypassing security
mechanisms to access secure documents, or emailing documents to an unauthorized
individual. Because of the vast amount of information and data on systems, tools for
detecting attacks focus on the development and use of automated processes. Some
current techniques being deployed as countermeasures are Anomaly Detections Sys-
tems, data mining event logs, and Honeypots. These techniques attempt to either
determine when an attack occurs or make security controls so effective that a com-
promise is unfeasible.
Even with the advancement of technical countermeasures and law enforcement
and counterintelligence strategies, current methodologies are unproven and have had
limited success as trends indicate the insider threat is still a major concern. The
current frameworks for risk analysis suggest independent methods that have failed to
be effective because the insider threat is a problem that transcends functional areas.
This research proposes a different mentality by leveraging the indicators from each
area in a multidisciplinary approach and collaborates them in a cohesive manner that
can be used to identify malicious insiders.
5.2 MAMIT
The goal of the Multidisciplinary Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat
(MAMIT) is identification of suspicious individuals within an organization that dis-
play a credible amount of threat so follow-up action can be taken. Figure 5.2 illustrates
the proposed cohesive process for countering the malicious insider.
5.2.1 Likelihood Matrix. The MAMIT process requires a methodology to
combine the different indicators to form one specific threat level that identifies an
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Figure 5.2: Multidisciplinary framework for mitigating the
insider threat.
individual’s risk of being a malicious insider. The Likelihood Matrix performs this
function by leveraging the independent findings from each area and merging them
together. This process develops a method for quantifying the behavior and technical
indicators.
Behavior Indicators. A study of past American spies determined
that 80% exhibited one or more conditions of security concern defined in the Guide-
lines for Security Clearance [18]. The Guidelines for Security Clearance is a United
States directive outlining areas of interest when considering if an individual should be
granted a clearance for accessing classified information [38]. The adjudicative process
assesses the risk associated with entrusting an individual with sensitive information.
The 150 case studies in the PERSEREC database [12] were examined along with the
thirteen specific guidelines outlined in the directive. The relevant areas that appear
to indicate behavior trends for the malicious insider in these case studies are:
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• Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
• Guideline B: Foreign influence
• Guideline E: Personal conduct
• Guideline F: Financial considerations
• Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders
• Guideline J: Criminal conduct
• Guideline K: Security violations
• Guideline M: Misuse of information technology systems
These guidelines provide an adequate method for quantifying the motives and
behavior characteristics of the insider threat. As such, these areas are used as the
behavior indicators for the MAMIT framework. Guideline A, naturally, is modified
to specify allegiance to the organization and Guideline B refers to an outside or
competing organization. Each area is independently evaluated and assigned a numeric
value based on the determined risk for that area.
Technical Indicators. Technical indicators focus on specifying
opportunities within the system. Quantifying these attributes is a straight-forward
process. The first indicator focuses on characterizing position and system access
within the organization. For example, mid-level management may receive a rating
somewhere near the middle of the scale, whereas a high ranking official or a system
administrator with full access receives a high rating. The second indicator measures
the technical ability of the individual. Someone that is technically savvy with an
extensive understanding of the system’s inner workings possesses a higher capability
than a person with little technical ability. This rating is based solely on a person’s
skill and knowledge, not their role within the organization. These two ratings, coupled
with the behavior indicators, comprise ten factors used to determine an individual’s
threat level.
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Putting it together. The first step in building the Likelihood
Matrix is an initial analysis of an individual by assigning a numerical value for each
of the ten factors. The values are averaged, producing an individual threat level. This
process is accomplished for each person within the organization. When everyone has
been assigned their threat level, one overall mean threat level for the organization is
calculated by averaging the individual threat levels together.
Statistical Analysis. A prediction interval for the mean threat
level of the organization is determined using the t-distribution. If an individual’s
threat level falls above the interval, they are identified as a potential insider threat.
In statistical analysis the t-distribution is used to estimate the mean with an unknown
population variance [11]. The individual threat levels are random variables because
the characteristics of individuals will inevitably introduce some variance in the as-
signed values. When the random variables are averaged together the organization’s
mean threat level is produced. The prediction interval is used to determine if any
single individual’s threat level lies outside the norm for the organization’s calculated
threat level. The underlying goal of the statistical analysis is to characterize the nor-
mal threat level for an organization and use a method to identify the individuals that
pose an unacceptable threat level. The following formula is used for determining the
interval for the mean threat level:
X¯ ± tα
2
s
√
1 +
1
n
(5.1)
where the prediction level is 100(1− α)%,
X¯ is the overall mean threat level of the organization,
t is the t variate at α
2
,
s is the standard deviation, and
n is the number of individuals within the organization.
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The assigned prediction level determines the threshold for identifying threats.
For example, a 90% prediction interval states that there is a 5% chance that an indi-
vidual threat level will fall above the calculated range. Incidently, there is also a 5%
chance it will fall below the interval, but this is not a concern for identifying an insider
threat. When determining the prediction level to choose, a larger percentage results
in a greater interval. Setting the value to a smaller percentage can be beneficial for
an organization concerned with strict security, such as a highly classified government
agency. The trade-off, however, is an increased likelihood of false positives.
Updates. Evaluation of personnel and their threat levels is an
ongoing process that requires constant updates. For example, a promotion or mod-
ification within the system may change an individual’s opportunity. Additionally,
divorce or financial loss may increase the behavior risk. It is important to continually
monitor and update these factors to maintain current threat levels. A significant part
of this process involves active participation by immediate supervisors. Involvement of
supervisors is critical because they are typically in the best position to notice changes
when they first occur [8].
5.2.2 Centralized Human Analyst. Ultimately, the purpose of MAMIT is
to identify potential insider threats by using the different indicators. The effective
implementation of this scheme requires a central analyst to funnel the information
to and maintain the Likelihood Matrix. This responsibility falls on the role of the
Centralized Human Analyst (CHA).
The CHA is a section within the organization that compiles the intelligence re-
ceived from each of the different areas and updates the matrix. This concept provides
one entity that has full scope of the problem and maintains two-way communication
to each area involved in the process. The CHA should consist of trusted agent(s) and
limited to the number of people that can effectively monitor the organization. Using
the Likelihood Matrix, the CHA can identify the individuals that require further ob-
servation. Maintaining one central oversight should provide earlier detection and less
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compromise to information systems. These techniques are demonstrated in the next
section using a high profile case study.
5.3 Case Study
The case involving Robert Hanssen is one of the most well-known and damag-
ing incidents involving a malicious insider. The details of his case study are used to
demonstrate the application and effectiveness of the MAMIT process. The informa-
tion gathered for this analysis is a collection of documented testimony and reports
from [10,12,31].
5.3.1 The Hanssen Attack Cycle. Robert Hanssen was a 27-year veteran of
the FBI who was caught spying for Russia for more than 15 years. During this time
he had a high level of opportunity through clearance and access as high as almost
anyone else in the government. He participated in operational security and counterin-
telligence efforts for programs involving some of the most sensitive projects within the
intelligence community. Throughout his ordeal he demonstrated motivation factors
of money, job dissatisfaction and a feeling of superiority. Hanssen demonstrated the
personality traits identified by Dr. Gelles consistent with narcissism. It is possible
these traits stem from claims of negative experiences early in life, especially abuse
by his father. These factors resulted in a significant threat level that was ultimately
triggered by financial circumstances. The complete success of his attacks for such an
extended period of time led to an extensive amount of compromise. Court documents
revealed that Hanssen divulged some of the most highly compartmented information
regarding intelligence projects, including U.S. nuclear war defenses. It was determined
that he was responsible for providing over 6,000 pages of classified documents and the
identities of three Russian agents working for the United States. The Russians paid
Hanssen $1.4 million for the information he provided.
5.3.2 Indicators and Likelihood Matrix. For analysis of Hanssen’s threat
level, each indicator variable is set to a value representative of his rating for the
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majority of the compromise period. A range of 1 to 10 is used in increments of
0.5, with the value 10 representing the highest threat. When assigning the values,
indicators were used from the case studies that were revealed during the compromise
timeframe to co-workers, supervisors, and other individuals in a position to report the
incidents to a CHA. If something was revealed after his capture, it was not included
in the assessment of his ratings.
Externally, Hanssen appeared to have a high level of allegiance to his organi-
zation. He was a loyal member of a conservative Catholic group, Opus Dei, which
strongly rejects communism. Although he appeared loyal to the U.S., there were
some allegiance indicators through notes sent to supervisors that he was unhappy
with the administration within the FBI and was dissatisfied with his sudden lack of
promotions. His foreign influence was reasonably high. His 27-year career in the FBI
involved travel to different countries and introduced him to many foreign contacts. He
even learned to speak Russian fluently. Hanssen’s personal conduct displayed a strong
dislike for co-workers and a sense of isolation or not fitting in. His detached personal-
ity was a significant factor in not being promoted late in his career. He also displayed
strong financial indicators by living more extravagantly than his salary allowed. His
expenses included tuition for six children in private schools and colleges, along with
a house payment in the New York suburbs. His brother-in-law, also an FBI agent,
grew suspicious about his money and reported Hanssen to supervisors. His mental
and emotional aspect consistently displayed signs of narcissism through an inflated
self-image and lack of empathy for others. Hanssen did not appear to have a criminal
record. However, some of his security violations seem to indicate a tendency towards
criminal behavior. He had been identified a number of times with highly classified
information in his possession that he should not have been viewing and would often
boast about insight into stories that were not relevant to his work. There are several
instances where Hanssen was counseled for his misuse of information systems includ-
ing browsing through computer systems and hacking into his boss’s computer. As far
as technical indicators, Hanssen had an extreme amount of access to essentially all
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Table 5.1: Indicator Values for Robert Hanssen
Indicators Assigned Values
Allegiance to the organization 4.0
Foreign influence 8.5
Personal conduct 8.0
Financial considerations 10.0
Emotional, mental, and personality disorders 9.0
Criminal conduct 4.0
Security violations 9.0
Misuse of information technology systems 9.5
Access 10.0
Ability 10.0
information within the organization and was a recognized expert in computer systems
and technology. Table 5.1 summarizes the values assigned for the indicators based on
the relevant information from the case studies.
5.3.3 Identifying a Spy. Averaging the assigned indicator values, the threat
level for Hanssen equates to a value of 8.2. Unfortunately, information on Hanssen’s
co-workers is unavailable and must be assumed. For demonstration purposes of
MAMIT, assume Hanssen’s co-workers consisted of 30 other employees and the orga-
nization’s overall mean threat level of all individuals equated to 4.0 with a variance of
2.5. These assignments for an FBI organization do not appear unreasonable and would
indicate a somewhat moderate risk level by the employees. Using the t-distribution
over a 90% prediction interval (cf., (5.1)), the range of acceptable threat levels is cal-
culated to fall between 1.3 and 6.70. Because Hanssen’s threat level falls above this
range, he is identified as a potential threat. Using 4.0 as an acceptable mean, Hanssen
would be flagged as a threat for any level of variance up to 6.0. This is a somewhat
significant variance and in all likelihood is greater than what would be expected.
When Hanssen was finally detected, he was caught by chance. A Russian double
agent provided the U.S. a file that had been transferred by Hanssen to the Russians.
Hanssen was ultimately identified by a clear set of fingerprints located on a garbage
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bag that had contained the file. It is highly probable that if the MAMIT process had
been used and information was correctly funneled to a CHA for analysis, Hanssen
would have been identified as a possible threat and discovered much earlier.
5.4 MAMIT Implementation Scheme
A significant concern that arises from the MAMIT framework is the impact
on organizational alignment. The implementation scheme of the MAMIT process
calls into question how security fits into typical organizational structures. Current
organization structures typically isolate the different areas of security, with system
administrators usually responsible for network security and separate divisions for
intelligence and physical security. A study performed by CSO found that 81% of
companies separate information and physical security [14]. The separation of these
areas does not allow for a cohesive flow of information. Additionally performing dual
tasks, such as using the system administrator to perform network management and
security, does not provide responsible oversight.
The MAMIT framework demonstrates a need to shift from the current culture
and way of doing business. The MAMIT functionality establishes a requirement for
one authority, as the role of the CHA, to maintain the full spectrum of security.
The CHA is responsible for the security management of the organization, but relies
heavily on inputs from the system administrators, direct supervisors, and other related
functions. These other areas are still a critical part of solving the problem and require
individuals in these positions to be security conscious. The main difference, however, is
that the accountability and consolidation of information focuses on one area, providing
single oversight. Additionally, the CHA should be outside of the normal organization
structure and report directly to top-level executives. The benefits of this methodology
are that it brings all aspects of security within the organization together and creates
a flow of information to one responsible authority for identifying security risks.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter introduces a formal framework for risk analysis of the insider
threat. The MAMIT approach focuses on the combining of indicators using a multi-
disciplinary approach producing a single identifier for risk analysis. The effectiveness
of MAMIT is illustrated through the case study of Robert Hanssen which demon-
strates the process would likely have identified him as an insider threat. Finally, the
impact on organization alignment is discussed.
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VI. Conclusions
This chapter presents the research conclusions, significance, and recommended areas
for future research.
6.1 Problem Summary
Addressing the insider threat using systematic and formulated methodologies is
an inherently difficult problem. The threat is typically viewed in an abstract manner
without a method to represent the threat or means for formally identifying risks to the
system. A security model provides a process to formally analyze the safety of a security
policy and implementation scheme. Additionally, risk analysis formally identifies
threats to the system by determining and measuring potentially dangerous indicators.
Current techniques for risk analysis on the insider threat have not demonstrated an
effectiveness through case studies or implementation. Formalizing the insider threat
through security modelling and risk analysis provides a method to ensure sound policy
implementation and identify individuals that pose a threat.
6.2 Conclusions of Research
The goals of this research were to develop a comprehensive security model that
adequately determines the safety of a system against the insider threat and to present
a risk analysis framework using a multidisciplinary approach capable of identifying
potential malicious insiders.
6.2.1 Security Model. A formal security model, SPM-IT, analyzes the safety
of a system against the insider threat. Initially a comprehensive taxonomy is devel-
oped using functional decomposition that characterizes the threat through definable
and measurable actions. The actions are specified using SPM to create a compre-
hensive and formal security model for the insider threat. SPM-IT maintains acyclic
and attenuating rules, thereby preserving the generality and tractable analysis of the
original SPM. Through the maximal state, the safety of a security policy and imple-
mentation scheme for the insider threat can be determined. Mitigation techniques
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can be implemented or changes in the policy can reduce the identified vulnerabilities
within the system. The power and expressiveness of SPM-IT is demonstrated through
a model of a simple policy and implementation scheme assuming a university setting.
6.2.2 Risk Analysis. The research introduces a formal framework for risk
analysis of the insider threat. The MAMIT approach effectively identifies possible
malicious insiders based on their threat level. The strategy focuses on the combining
of information using a multidisciplinary approach producing a single identifier for risk
analysis. Because the indicators are provided to a central analyst, individuals with an
elevated threat level can be identified earlier and techniques enacted to mitigate the
threat. Statistical analysis of individual threat levels against their organization iden-
tify the individuals that exhibit indicators consistent with malicious insiders. Since
the framework analyzes threat levels against co-workers within the same organiza-
tion, the methodology effectively adapts to different organizations and can be applied
with the prediction interval set to the desired threshold. The effectiveness of MAMIT
is illustrated through the case study of Robert Hanssen, demonstrating the process
would likely have identified him as an insider threat.
6.3 Significance of Research
This research proposes the first known formal security model capable of analyz-
ing the safety of a system against the insider threat. Included in the process is the
development of a well-defined taxonomy that expresses the malicious insider through
distinct actions capable of being decomposed and analyzed. Additionally, the research
demonstrates there is no distinction between inert and control rights for the insider
threat. This notion is a significant finding that demonstrates both types of rights
can alter the protection state of a system and thus, both must be considered when
modelling the insider threat.
The research also introduces a framework for risk analysis that is demonstrated
through a well-documented case study. The MAMIT framework proves effective at
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identifying a malicious insider through practical implementation. The multidisci-
plinary process also questions how security fits into typical organizational structures.
The MAMIT process demonstrates a need to shift away from the standard organiza-
tion structure to one having a central authority specifically for security matters.
The premises for much of this research was validated by independent scholars
through the publishing of this work in the proceedings of two international security
conferences. The process of defining a comprehensive and analyzable taxonomy for the
insider threat using functional decomposition was presented in St. Petersburg, Russia
at the 2005 Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architecture for Computer Network
Security workshop [4]. Additionally, the MAMIT framework is to be presented in
Maryland at the 2006 International Conference on Information Warfare and Security
[5].
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research
The generality of SPM-IT means it can model more complex policies and sys-
tems. To further demonstrate the expressiveness and effectiveness of SPM-IT, the
implementation of more complex policies and systems should be performed. Addi-
tionally, SPM-IT analysis can be automated using a simulation engine such as AFIT’s
Cyber OpeRations Emulator (CORE). The OPNET tool embedded in CORE allows
specification of granular objects such as users, objects, and rights. Security policies
and implementation schemes of significant magnitude can be specified, allowing the
simulator to generate the ticket transfers for analysis. This method creates an auto-
mated process for identifying vulnerabilities and determining the safety of a system
for a large class of systems. Another area for research is to determine whether the
taxonomy developed in this research can be specified using the frameworks of other
established security models such as the take-grant model. It would be interesting
to compare the expressiveness of SPM-IT against these other models for the insider
threat.
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The MAMIT framework proved effective at identifying Robert Hanssen as a
potential malicious insider. The case study, however, only demonstrates the effec-
tiveness against an espionage threat to the United States. More research is required
to determine if MAMIT is effective for other insider threat types. Additionally, the
next logical step for analysis is implementing the MAMIT framework in a real-world
environment. This would allow the determination of false-positive rates and the ef-
fectiveness and practicality of implementing the framework. Finally, the legal basis
for collecting certain information for the MAMIT process must be examined.
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Appendix A. Security Policy with Mitigation Strategies
This is the complete security policy for the SPM-IT university example with the
mitigation strategies included.
1. TS = {Prof, Stu, Admin, Verification Authority}, TO = {server, file}
2. R = {r :c, w :c, x :c, q}
3. link1(P, S) = true
link2(P, A1) = true
link3(P, A2) = true
link4(P, A3) = true
link5(S, P) = true
link6(S, A1) = true
link7(S, A2) = true
link8(S, A3) = true
link9(A1, P) = true
link10(A1, S) = true
link11(A1, A2) = true
link12(A1, A3) = true
link13(A2, P) = true
link14(A2, S) = true
link15(A2, A1) = true
link16(A2, A3) = true
link17(A3, P) = true
link18(A3, S) = true
link19(A3, A1) = true
link20(A3, A2) = true
link21(V1, P) = true
link22(V1, S) = true
link23(V1, A2) = true
75
link24(V1, A3) = true
link25(V2, P) = true
link26(V3, S) = true
4. f1(Prof, Stu) = T × R
f2(Prof, Admin) = ∅
f3(Prof, Admin) = T × R
f4(Prof, Admin) = ∅
f5(Stu, Prof) = T × R
f6(Stu, Admin) = ∅
f7(Stu, Admin) = ∅
f8(Stu, Admin) = T × R
f9(Admin, Prof) = {Verification Authority/x}
f10(Admin, Stu) = {Verification Authority/x}
f11(Admin, Admin) = {Verification Authority/x}
f12(Admin, Admin) = {Verification Authority/x}
f13(Admin, Prof) = {Verification Authority/x}
f14(Admin, Stu) = ∅
f15(Admin, Admin) = ∅
f16(Admin, Admin) = ∅
f17(Admin, Prof) = ∅
f18(Admin, Stu) = {Verification Authority/x}
f19(Admin, Admin) = ∅
f20(Admin, Admin) = ∅
f21(Verification Authority, Prof) = {server/r}
f22(Verification Authority, Stu) = {server/r}
f23(Verification Authority, Admin) = {server/r}
f24(Verification Authority, Admin) = {server/r}
f25(Verification Authority, Prof) = {server/r}
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f26(Verification Authority, Stu) = {server/r}
5. cc(Prof) = ∅
cc(Stu) = ∅
cc(Verification Authority) = ∅
cc(Admin) = {Admin, Prof, Stu, Verification Authority}
6. cr(Admin, Admin) = {self/rw :c} | {Admin/rw :c}
cr(Admin, Prof) = {Prof/rw :c} | ∅
cr(Admin, Stu) = {Stu/rw :c} | ∅
cr(Admin, Verification Authority) = {Verification Authority/rwx :c}
τ(P) = Prof
τ(S) = Stu
τ(A1) = τ(A2) = τ(A3) = Admin
τ(V1) = τ(V2) = τ(V3) = Verification Authority
τ(server p) = τ(server s) = τ(server z) = server
τ(file p1) = τ(file s1) = τ(file z1) = file
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